1 ... 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 ... 21

The position on authority - In the high court of justice

səhifə14/21
tarix22.01.2018
ölçüsü0.5 Mb.

The position on authority


  1. The conclusion which I would reach as a matter of principle by considering the reasons for implying an investigative duty is consistent with the case law referred to earlier. In all the cases which have postulated a duty to investigate alleged violations of article 3 the duty is expressed to be a duty to investigate an arguable claim or credible assertion of torture or other inhuman or degrading treatment by state agents. This is so both when the source of the investigative duty is treated as being article 3 itself (see e.g. the passage from the Assenov case quoted at paragraph 143 above) and when the duty is derived from article 13 (see e.g. the statement in Aksoy v Turkey quoted at paragraph 141 above). No case was cited in argument in which the European Court, let alone any domestic court, has said that there is a duty to investigate not just an allegation of ill-treatment committed by state agents but an allegation that state agents have exposed an individual to a risk of ill-treatment by others.

  2. There are cases in which the European Court has held that a duty to investigate allegations of serious mistreatment may arise even where the individuals who inflicted the mistreatment were not agents of the state: see e.g. MC v Bulgaria (2005) 40 EHRR 20, para 151; Šečić v Croatia [2007] ECHR 1159, para 53. An example is 97 Members of the Gldani Congregation of Jehovah’s Witnesses v Georgia (2008) 46 EHRR 30. The applicants in that case were members of a congregation of Jehovah’s witnesses who were attacked in a theatre where they were meeting. Some of them were badly beaten. The attack was filmed and some of the assailants were clearly identifiable. Nevertheless, the Georgian authorities made no serious attempt to investigate the incident. The Court held that the duty under article 3 to conduct an effective official investigation into allegations of ill-treatment “cannot be considered in principle to be limited solely to cases of ill-treatment by state agents” (para 97) and that the attitude of total indifference shown by the Georgian authorities amounted to a breach of this obligation.

  3. In Gldani and other such cases the alleged acts of ill-treatment were perpetrated within the state’s jurisdiction. What is engaged in such cases is the positive obligation of the state to protect those within its jurisdiction from treatment prohibited by article 3, which may require the state to investigate a credible complaint of such ill-treatment with a view to identifying and punishing those responsible. It remains the case, however, that the duty to conduct an effective official investigation in such cases is a duty to investigate alleged ill-treatment; it is not a duty to investigate the conduct of state officials in exposing the individuals concerned to the risk of ill-treatment.

  4. The European Court has expressly confirmed that the state’s obligation to investigate ill-treatment, whether pursuant to article 3 or article 13, applies only in relation to ill-treatment allegedly committed within its jurisdiction: see Al-Adsani v UK (2002) 34 EHRR 11, para 38. This is also consistent with international law as embodied in article 12 of UNCAT, on which the Court drew in Aksoy v Turkey in recognising the investigative duty (see paragraph 141 above). It follows that, in ordinary circumstances at least, the duty to conduct an investigation does not apply to ill-treatment which takes place in another country to which the individual in question has been sent.

  5. The claimants’ contention that there is a duty to investigate an arguable breach of the non-refoulement obligation is largely founded on two recent decisions of the European Court, which I have not yet discussed. Much of the oral argument was focused on these two cases, and I will consider them next. Those cases apart, however, I conclude that the case law does not support, and indeed is inconsistent with, the claimants’ contention.

The

El-Masri

case


  1. The first and principal case on which the claimants relied is El-Masri v Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (2013) 57 EHRR 25. Mr El-Masri was a German national who was arrested on entering Macedonia. He was taken by armed men in civilian clothes to a hotel in Skopje, where he was incarcerated for 23 days. During this time he was interrogated repeatedly about possible links with militant Islamic groups. He was then taken to Skopje Airport, where he was handed over to a CIA rendition team. They assaulted and stripped Mr El-Masri and forced a suppository into his anus. He was blindfolded, hooded, shackled and marched to a waiting aircraft. He was flown to Afghanistan and taken to a secret site used as a detention and interrogation facility by the CIA. On arrival he was kicked and beaten. He was kept in a small, dirty, concrete cell with no bed. Mr El-Masri was held in captivity in this place for over four months, without any contact with the outside world. At the end of that time he was returned to Germany via Albania.

  2. On Mr El-Masri’s application to the European Court of Human Rights for a remedy against Macedonia, the Macedonian Government denied all his allegations including that he had ever been detained. On examining the evidence, the Court sitting as a Grand Chamber found Mr El-Masri’s allegations proved beyond reasonable doubt.

  3. Mr El-Masri alleged violations of both the substantive and procedural aspects of article 3. The Court considered the procedural aspect first. After his release, Mr El-Masri had lodged a formal criminal complaint with the Macedonian authorities. However, the public prosecutor had rejected his complaint relying solely on a report from the Ministry of the Interior denying that Mr El-Masri had been detained by the Macedonian authorities, without making any other attempt whatever to investigate his allegations. The Court concluded (para 193) that this summary investigation “cannot be regarded as an effective one capable of leading to the identification and punishment of those responsible for the alleged event and of establishing the truth”. On this basis the court found that there had been a breach of the investigative duty.

  4. The Court also found that there had been breaches of Macedonia’s substantive obligations under article 3 consisting in: (i) subjecting Mr El-Masri to inhuman and degrading treatment when he was detained in the hotel in Skopje (para 204); (ii) actively facilitating and not taking any measure to prevent his ill-treatment at Skopje airport by CIA agents (para 211); and (iii) breach of the non-refoulement obligation in transferring him into the custody of the US authorities in circumstances where there were substantial grounds for believing that he would be subjected to treatment contrary to article 3 (para 220). In relation to that transfer, the Court also made a specific finding (at para 221) that Mr El-Masri was subjected to “extraordinary rendition”, defined as:

“an extra-judicial transfer of persons from one jurisdiction or State to another, for the purposes of detention and interrogation outside the normal legal system, where there was a real risk of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment.”

  1. On behalf of the claimants, Mr Fordham QC submitted that in discussing the lack of an effective investigation the Court did not differentiate between the various substantive breaches of article 3 disclosed by Mr El-Masri’s claim, one of which was a breach of the non-refoulement obligation. Mr Fordham submitted that the Court thus implicitly treated the allegation of this breach as a matter which the Macedonian state had a duty to investigate.

  2. There is no explicit discussion in the judgment of the Grand Chamber of the question whether the state’s duty to investigate arguable breaches of article 3 extends to an alleged breach of the non-refoulement obligation. Nor in my view does the decision support the claimants’ case in that regard. Rather, the opposite. The Court stated the principle as being that there should be an effective official investigation “where an individual raises an arguable claim that he has suffered treatment infringing art. 3 at the hands of the police or other similar agents of the state” (para 182). This formulation does not encompass an arguable breach of the non-refoulement obligation. Moreover, the breach of the procedural aspect of article 3 found by the Court related to the failure to investigate Mr El-Masri’s criminal complaint. The subject matter of that complaint was his “ill-treatment by state agents and their active involvement in his subsequent rendition by CIA agents”: it was this “prima facie case of misconduct on the part of the security forces of the respondent State” which warranted an investigation (para 186). Thus the allegations which were held to require an effective investigation went well beyond an alleged breach of the non-refoulement obligation and involved criminal wrongdoing by state agents. I see nothing in this decision which would justify an inference that a duty to investigate arises whenever an arguable claim is made that a person was exposed to a real risk of treatment contrary to article 3 by reason of their transfer to another state.

Dzhurayev v Russia



  1. The second case on which the claimants particularly rely is Dzhurayev v Russia (2013) 57 EHRR 22, decided by the First Section of the European Court a few months after the El-Masri case.

  2. The facts, as found by the Court (at para 138), were that the applicant was kidnapped by unidentified persons in Moscow, detained by his kidnappers in Moscow for one to two days, then forcibly taken by them to an airport and put on a flight to Tajikistan, where he was immediately detained by the Tajik authorities. In considering whether there had been a breach of article 3, the Court began by examining whether the applicant’s forcible return to Tajikistan exposed him to a real risk of treatment contrary to article 3 and concluded that it did (para 176).

  3. The Court next applied the principle that where state authorities are aware that an individual within their jurisdiction faces a real and imminent risk of torture or other inhuman or degrading treatment, including such ill-treatment administered by private individuals, they have a positive duty to take reasonable “operational” measures to prevent that occurring. The Court identified this principle by analogy with its case law concerning article 2,7 and held that it is capable of applying where the risk involves transfer to another state (paras 179-180). On the facts the Court found that the failure of the Russian authorities to take any measures to protect the applicant against his forcible transfer to Tajikistan, in particular through a Moscow airport, amounted to a violation of this positive obligation (paras 183-185).

  4. The Court also held that the Russian authorities had a duty to conduct an effective investigation into the applicant’s abduction and his ensuing exposure to ill-treatment and torture in Tajikistan (para 190). They noted that the relevant information and complaints were brought to the attention of the Russian authorities immediately after the applicant’s abduction and said (para 191):

“It became obvious at a certain stage that the applicant had a prima facie case under art. 3 of the Convention that warranted an effective investigation at the domestic level. While there may have been some doubt immediately after the applicant’s abduction in Moscow by unidentified persons as to the role played by Russian State agents in the incident, the complaint about his ensuing transfer to Tajikistan through a Moscow airport in breach of all legal procedures should have triggered the authorities’ utmost attention, inasmuch as the applicant’s representatives claimed that State agents had been actively or passively involved in that operation.”

The Court found that such investigative steps as had been taken were flawed in numerous respects amounting to a breach of the procedural obligation under article 3.



  1. Finally the Court found that Russia was also liable under the Convention on account of the involvement of agents of the Russian state in the applicant’s forcible transfer to Tajikistan. The Court considered that he could not have been put on board an aircraft and flown to Tajikistan without the authorisation, or at least acquiescence, of the Russian authorities (para 202). The Court found the case “all the more disturbing” because the transfer to Tajikistan took place outside the normal legal system and with the aim of circumventing the fact that the applicant had been granted temporary asylum in Russia and could not lawfully be extradited (para 204).

  2. Again, I do not consider that this decision supports the claimants’ contention that a duty to investigate arises whenever there is an arguable claim that an individual was transferred to another state where he faced a real risk of ill-treatment. As in El-Masri, in the Dzhurayev case the principle was stated as being that “there should be an effective official investigation into any arguable claim of torture or any ill-treatment by state agents” (para 187). What triggered the duty to investigate, in the Court’s opinion, was the role played or which may have been played by Russian state agents in the applicant’s abduction and transfer, and in particular the implication which arose from the applicant’s transfer through a Moscow airport in breach of all legal procedures that state agents had been actively or passively involved in an illegal operation.


Dostları ilə paylaş:

©2018 Учебные документы
Рады что Вы стали частью нашего образовательного сообщества.
?


the-sign-and-the-seal--a-28.html

the-sign-and-the-seal--a-32.html

the-sign-and-the-seal--a-37.html

the-sign-and-the-seal--a-41.html

the-sign-and-the-seal--a-5.html